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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes significant cases decided by the Georgia Court
of Appeals during the period of June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2019, that
pertain to Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning. Due to the COVID19 pandemic, the Georgia General Assembly suspended its 2020 session
and thus no significant legislation was enacted during the reporting
period. 1 This report does however discuss relevant legislation that was
pending during the reporting period and describes the Governor’s Order
issued in April 2020 that permitted remote notarization and witnessing
of estate planning documents during the pandemic.
I. GEORGIA CASES
A. Proof of Proper Attestation of Wills
In order to be admitted to probate in Georgia, a will must be signed
by the testator and attested by two witnesses who also sign the will. 2 In
Wilbur v. Floyd, 3 the court of appeals vacated a summary judgment
granted by the trial court, stating that that court had erred in finding
that, as a matter of law, the will did not comply with the attestation

* Professor Emerita, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of
Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981). Reporter, Probate Code
Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee, Trust Code Revision
Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Past President, American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC). Author, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIPS AND
CONSERVATORSHIPS (West, 2020–2021 ed.); REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
GEORGIA (West, 2020–21 ed.); GEORGIA TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (West, 2020–2021 ed.). The
author is grateful to Georgia State University College of Law graduates Laura Shoop and
Daylan Green for their valuable research assistance.
1 For an analysis of wills and trusts during the prior survey period, see Mary F. Radford,
Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 327 (2019).
2 O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20 (2020).
3 353 Ga. App. 864, 839 S.E.2d 675 (2020).
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requirements. 4 The problem in this case was that the page containing the
witnesses’ signatures was missing. 5
In December 2014, Gwen Wilbur executed a will naming her son,
Jeffrey, as the sole beneficiary and excluding her daughter, Patricia. The
attorney who drafted the will and his secretary were the attesting
witnesses. After Ms. Wilbur died in February 2015, Jeffrey filed a
petition to probate his mother’s will. The original will that was attached
to his petition contained the testator’s signature and the initials of both
the testator and the witnesses on each page. However, the attestation
page that contained the witnesses’ signatures was missing from the will. 6
Patricia filed a caveat, arguing that the will was invalid because it did
not include an attestation page and thus lacked the required formalities. 7
The drafting attorney then submitted an amended petition, including
another copy of the will and an affidavit signed by him stating that he
and his secretary had witnessed the testator signing the will.
Unfortunately, the copy of the will attached to the amended petition also
lacked the attestation page. The drafting attorney then filed a second
affidavit and attached a copy of the will that contained the attestation
page. 8 (The court of appeals noted that, apart from the missing
attestation page, the original will that lacked the attestation page and
the copy of the will that contained the attestation page were identical.) 9
At the probate court hearing, the drafting attorney and his secretary both
testified that they had witnessed the testator’s signature, had initialed
each page of the will next to the testator’s initials, and had signed their
names to an attestation clause. The probate court granted Patricia’s
motion to dismiss, stating that the will lacked the necessary
formalities. 10
Jeffrey appealed to the superior court and filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the will was valid in form and that he had
included a copy of the attestation page in his amended petition. Patricia
countered with a motion for summary judgment, stating that the will
lacked testamentary formalities and that Jeffrey could not probate a copy
Id. at 864, 839 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 866, 839 S.E.2d at 677.
6 Id. at 865, 839 S.E.2d at 677.
7 Id. at 865, 839 S.E.2d at 677. Patricia also contended that the testator lacked
testamentary capacity, that Jeffrey had unduly influenced and coerced the testator to
change her will, and that the testator’s purported signature on the will was forged. Id.
8 Id. at 865–66, 839 S.E.2d at 677. In the affidavit, the drafting attorney stated that he
thought the entire will, including the attestation page, had been filed with the probate court
because he had a copy containing the attestation page that was stamped “filed in office on
March 17, 2015.” Id. at 866, 839 S.E.2d at 677.
9 Id. at 870, n.2, 839 S.E.2d at 680, n. 2.
10 Id. at 866, 839 S.E.2d at 677–78.
4
5
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of the will in lieu of the original because the original will was not missing
in its entirety. 11 Similarly to the probate court, the superior court held
that the will was invalid and granted Patricia’s motion for summary
judgment. 12 The superior court agreed with Patricia that a copy of the
will could not be used to show that the testamentary formalities had been
met because the original will had not been lost. 13
Jeffrey appealed to the court of appeals, contending that the copy of
the will with the attestation page satisfied the required testamentary
formalities and established the will’s validity. 14 The court of appeals first
reiterated that the “sole question” in a probate proceeding is “whether
the paper propounded is, or is not, the last will and testament of the
deceased.” 15 To make the determination, courts must consider, among
other things, “whether the document was properly executed.” 16 The court
of appeals, citing O.C.G.A. § 53-4-55, 17 stated that the court’s focus
should be to “seek diligently” for the testator’s intent and give it effect to
the extent that it is consistent with the law. 18 To preserve individuals’
rights to determine the disposition of their property after their death,
“the rules relating to execution have remained simple and issues of
proper attestation have generally presented fact issues for a jury.” 19
The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in granting
Patricia’s motion for summary judgment because a question of fact
remained as to whether the testamentary formalities were satisfied. 20
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b), 21 which establishes the requirements for proper
attestation, states: “A will shall be attested and subscribed . . . by two or
more competent witnesses. A witness to a will may attest by mark.” 22 The
court of appeals noted that the statute only required that the witnesses’
signatures be “affixed to the writing,” indicating that an attestation
clause is not required for attestation to be proper. 23 Moreover, the court

11 O.C.G.A. § 53-4-46(b) (2020) provides in part that “A copy of a will may be offered for
probate in accordance with Chapter 5 of this title in lieu of the original will if the original
cannot be found to probate . . . .”
12 Wilbur, 353 Ga. App. at 866, 839 S.E.2d at 678.
13 Id. at 866, 839 S.E.2d at 678.
14 Id. at 867, 839 S.E.2d at 678.
15 Id. (quoting McDaniel v. McDaniel, 288 Ga. 711, 715, 707 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011)).
16 Id.
17 O.C.G.A. § 53-4-55 (2020).
18 Wilbur, 353 Ga. App. at 868, 839 S.E.2d at 679.
19 Id. at 868, 839 S.E.2d at 678.
20 Id. at 870, 839 S.E.2d at 680.
21 O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b) (2020).
22 Id.
23 Wilbur, 353 Ga. App. at 868, 839 S.E.2d at 679.
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noted that O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b) allows a witness to attest “by mark.” 24
Thus, a mark is sufficient to accomplish attestation or subscription; no
specific language is required. Therefore, the witnesses’ initials located
next to the testator’s initials could themselves suffice as attestation and
thus validate the will. 25 The court of appeals also found that O.C.G.A.
§ 53-5-21 26 allows a will to be proved upon the witnesses’ testimony or
“proof of their signatures.” 27 Therefore, “taking or procuring of
testimony . . . shall be sufficient for all purposes of the probate
proceedings, notwithstanding any other statute.” 28 The drafting
attorney’s affidavit, his testimony and that of his secretary, their initials
on each page of the will, and the testator’s signature on the will all
provided evidence of a factual question regarding whether the will’s
execution satisfied the testamentary formalities. 29
The court of appeals thus concluded that, in light of the overarching
principle of “the sanctity of the right to make a will,” the statutory
language that allows a witness to sign by mark, and the absence of any
requirement that attestation be in a specific form, as well as the fact that
questions of proper formalities are for juries, the superior court erred
when it found that there was no question of fact as to whether the will
complied with necessary formalities. 30 The court of appeals noted that
“[t]o conclude otherwise would essentially ignore the plain language of
the statute, as well as the testator’s intent, and deprive her of her right
to dispose of her property as she wished.” 31
B. When a House is Not a Home
It is not uncommon for a married testator to include in the will a clause
that allows the surviving spouse to continue to stay in their marital home
until the spouse dies or remarries or some other stated event occurs. It
was the meaning of just such a devise that led to litigation in DeMott v.
DeMott. 32 Richard DeMott died testate in 2015, survived by his children
and grandchildren from a prior marriage and his wife of less than two
years, Cynthia. Richard named his brother, Douglas, executor of his
estate and devised most of his property to his children and grandchildren.
However, his will included a clause that would allow his surviving wife
Id.
Id. at 869, 839 S.E.2d at 679.
26 O.C.G.A. § 53-5-21 (2020).
27 Wilbur, 353 Ga. App. at 869, 839 S.E.2d at 679.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 869, 839 S.E.2d at 679–80.
30 Id. at 869, 839 S.E.2d at 680.
31 Id. at 870, 839 S.E.2d at 680.
32 353 Ga. App. 190, 836 S.E.2d 612 (2019).
24
25

2020]

WILLS & TRUSTS

331

to stay in their marital residence. Their marital residence was one of
fourteen houses located on property belonging to Gin Creek, LLC, which
had been owned by the decedent and Douglas. They used the property to
host events and rent houses to clients. 33 The devise read, in pertinent
part, that Cynthia had the right to live in the house “for as long as she so
desires provided that she resides in the home as her primary residence
for at least nine months out of the year.” 34 The will went on to say that if
Cynthia “fails to live in our home as her primary residence for at least
nine months out of the year,” the property would pass to the LLC. 35
In early 2017, Douglas’s counsel ordered Cynthia to move out of the
house because she had only been physically present in the house for sixty
days during the previous year and thus had not met the condition set
forth in the will. 36 Cynthia refused and filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment, seeking interpretation of the portion of the will relating to her
ability to stay in the house. Both parties stipulated that the language of
the will was unambiguous and thus the trial court need not consider
parol evidence but rather could interpret the will as a matter of law. 37
The trial court found that the will did not require Cynthia to reside in
the house physically but rather only that she intend to use it as her
primary residence for the specified amount of time. 38 Douglas appealed,
contending that the will required Cynthia to occupy the house physically
for nine months out of the year. 39
Despite the parties’ stipulation to the contrary, the court of appeals
held that the will’s language was ambiguous and thus remanded the case
for the trial court to examine parol evidence to determine the testator’s
intent. 40 The court of appeals examined several sentences in the will
before concluding that the will was ambiguous. 41 According to the court,
the sentence requiring Cynthia to “reside[] in the home as her primary
residence for at least nine months out of the year” could be reasonably
interpreted, based upon the legal definition of “reside,” to require only
that Cynthia maintain the house as her legal residence for the specified
Id. at 190, 836 S.E.2d at 613.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 190, 836 S.E.2d at 613–14. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge McFadden
alluded to the fact that Cynthia was absent from her home because she was caring for her
ailing mother. Id. at 196, 836 S.E.2d at 617.
37 Id. at 191, 836 S.E.2d at 614. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-56 (2020) provides: “In construing a will,
the court may hear parol evidence of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time
of execution to explain all ambiguities, whether latent or patent.”
38 Demott, 350 Ga. App. at 191, 836 S.E.2d at 614.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 192–93, 836 S.E.2d at 615.
41 Id. 191, at 836 S.E.2d at 614.
33
34
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time. 42 However, the following sentence supported Douglas’s contention
that the will required Cynthia to be physically present because it
required Cynthia to “live” in the house. The court of appeals pointed out
that “live” is a nonlegal verb, defined as occupying, dwelling, or
residing. 43 Furthermore, a separate section of the will gave Cynthia the
right to use household items as long as she “remains in the house,” also
suggesting physical presence. 44 Because the will used words that could
have multiple meanings, the court of appeals concluded that parol
evidence was necessary to determine the testator’s intent and reversed
and remanded the case for the trial court to consider any available parol
evidence. 45
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge McFadden agreed that the case
should be remanded but differed with the majority regarding the reason
for the remand. 46 He determined that the trial court should first
determine whether Cynthia had another primary residence. According to
Judge McFadden, the language of the will, considered in the context of
the will as a whole as well as the law “[disfavoring] conditions remediable
by forfeiture[,]” unambiguously established that Cynthia’s having
another residence was a precondition to forfeiture. 47 The issue regarding
the amount of time that Cynthia resided in the McNeal house was
irrelevant unless it was established that she had another residence.
Because the trial court had not determined whether Cynthia had another
residence, he also concluded that remand was appropriate. 48
C. Modification of Trusts
In 2017, the General Assembly amended the Revised Georgia Trust
Code of 2010 and, among other things, expanded the procedures by which
the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust can unite to amend the trust. 49
As amended, O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(c) 50 states that, after the settlor has
died, a petition by the beneficiaries to modify the trust shall be approved
by the court provided “all the beneficiaries consent, the trustee has
received notice of the proposed modification, and the court concludes that
Id. at 191–92, 836 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 192, 836 S.E.2d at 614.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 192–93, 836 S.E.2d at 615.
46 Id. at 193, 836 S.E.2d at 615.
47 Id. at 196, 836 S.E.2d at 617.
48 Id.
49 Ga. H.R. Bill 121, Reg. Sess., 2018 Ga. Laws 262. These amendments are discussed in
Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 70 Mercer L. Rev. 275, 278–79 (2018).
50 O.C.G.A. § 53-12-61(c) (2019).
42
43
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modification is not inconsistent with any material purpose of such
trust.” 51 In 2020 in Glass v. Faircloth 52 (which was the first case to
discuss this new statute), the court of appeals determined that the trust
beneficiaries had correctly and successfully employed this procedure to
modify an irrevocable trust. 53 The Glass Dynasty Trust (Trust) had been
established in 2005 by Shirley Glass for the benefit of her husband’s
(Sherwin’s) sons, the sons’ descendants, and various Jewish charities.
The original trustees were Shirley Glass, Faircloth, and Sexton. Faircloth
and Sexton were officers in Sherwin’s businesses. In 2008, the trustees
signed a resolution that authorized immediate payment of trustees’
compensation (styled as their first payment) of $180,000 each and
“reasonable compensation” for prior years. After Shirley died, one of the
sons replaced her as trustee. 54 In 2012, after Faircloth and Sexton filed a
petition seeking an accounting, the court entered a consent judgment
that amended the trust to provide for “reasonable compensation” to the
trustees. 55 In April 2019, the beneficiaries filed a petition in the superior
court in which they sought to amend the trust pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 53-12-61(c). The amendment would allow the removal of any trustee by
a majority of the most senior generation of Sherwin’s descendant
beneficiaries. 56 The trustees were given notice and, after a hearing, the
trial court granted the petition. 57 Sexton and Faircloth were removed
pursuant to this amendment and replaced by a corporate trustee. 58
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the
amendment was valid, noting that the trial court had rendered a “wellreasoned and thorough order.” 59 The court of appeals focused its
discussion on the third prong of the modification statute, the question of
whether the modification was inconsistent with any material provision
of the trust. 60 The court of appeals held that the purpose of the trust was
Id.
354 Ga. App. 326, 840 S.E.2d 724 (2020). (A petition for writ of certiorari in this case
was filed with the Georgia Supreme Court on June 15, 2020.)
53 Id. at 326, 840 S.E.2d at 726. The Glass case was a consolidation of two cases arising
out of the Glass Dynasty Trust. In the first case, the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s
denial of an interlocutory injunction that would have prevented the trustees from paying
fees to themselves and their attorneys during litigation of the beneficiaries’ claims. Id. The
court of appeals determined that the denial was correct because the beneficiaries had not
shown that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Id. at 328–29, 840
S.E.2d at 727.
54 Id. at 326, 840 S.E.2d at 726.
55 Id. at 326–27, 840 S.E.2d at 726.
56 Id. at 327, 840 S.E.2d at 726–27.
57 Id. at 330, 840 S.E.2d at 728.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
51
52
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to support Sherwin’s descendants and the charities and its purpose was
“‘not,’ as noted by the superior court, ‘to provide for the well-being of the
independent trustees.’” 61 Faircloth and Sexton had based their argument
on O.C.G.A. § 53-12-221(a), 62 which allows for removal of a trustee “(1)
In accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument; or (2) Upon
petition to the court by any interested person showing good cause.” 63
They posited that allowing the beneficiaries to modify the Trust’s
removal provisions would render their quoted statute “meaningless.” 64
The court of appeals responded that the two statutes “operate in different
ways.” 65 The court of appeals pointed out that the modification statute
operates only after the settlor of the trust has died, whereas the removal
statute operates at any time. 66 Thus, the modification statute allows for
the addressing of concerns that the settlor might not have anticipated. 67
The court of appeals noted that a removal petition does not require the
beneficiaries’ consent and can be brought by any interested person at any
time. 68 The court of appeals concluded that “these two provisions address
different scenarios and are not inherently inconsistent, and there is no
ambiguity or practical effect that frustrates the purpose of either
provision.” 69 Finally, the court of appeals pointed out that, when the
General Assembly amended the modification statute in 2018 to allow for
modification with beneficiary consent, it knew that the removal statute
was in place and it could have either limited the modification statute with
respect to removal of a trustee or changed the language in the removal
statute. 70 The court of appeals, looking at the “plain statutory language”
of the modification statute, declined to “read into the Code a limitation
that is absent.” 71
D. Trustee Who Holds a Power of Appointment Over Trust Assets
It is not uncommon for the settlor of a trust to grant to certain
individuals the power to direct who will ultimately receive the trust

Id. at 330–31, 840 S.E.2d at 728.
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-221(a) (2019).
63 Id. at 331, 840 S.E.2d at 728–29 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-221(a)).
64 Id. at 331, 840 S.E.2d at 729.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 331–32, 840 S.E.2d at 729.
71 Id. at 332, 840 S.E.2d at 729.
61
62
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assets. This is referred to as a “power of appointment.” 72 The holder of a
power of appointment over trust property may also be a beneficiary or
even the trustee of a trust. That is what occurred in Peterson v.
Peterson, 73 a case that illustrates the confusion that can arise when one
individual is assigned more than one role in a trust. 74
This is the second appearance of the Peterson family before the court
of appeals, with an interim decision by the Georgia Supreme Court. The
first published opinion in this case was issued by the supreme court in
2018 in Peterson v. Peterson 75 (Peterson II), following an unpublished
opinion by the court of appeals in 2018 (Peterson I). 76 The current opinion
was handed down in 2019 by the court of appeals (Peterson III). 77
In 1994, Charles Hugh Peterson died testate, survived by his wife,
Mary Peterson (Mary), and his three sons, Alex, David, and Calhoun. His
will devised property to two testamentary trusts. The first was a marital
trust primarily for Mary’s benefit; the second was a by-pass trust for the
benefit of Mary and the three sons with the income to go to Mary during
her lifetime and the remainder of the property to pass to the sons upon
her death. Mary and all three sons were named as the co-trustees of both
the marital and by-pass trusts as well as co-executors for Mr. Peterson’s
will. The will stated that decisions made by a majority of the executors
or trustees would be controlling, as long as Mary was among the
majority. 78
The marital trust granted Mary the right to receive all the trust
income and the power to appoint any of the trust property to herself or to
any of the descendants or their spouses. Any property remaining in the
marital trust upon Mary’s death would pass to the by-pass trust or, if it
no longer existed, to the sons or their descendants. 79
The by-pass trust also provided that the trust income would go to Mary
but allowed the trustees to encroach on the principle as the Trustees may
deem necessary “to provide for the support in reasonable comfort of my
wife and to provide for the proper support and education of my
descendants taking into account and consideration any other means of
support they or any of them may have to the knowledge of the

72 For a discussion of powers of appointment, see MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS
AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA §§15:1–15:3 (2019–2020 ed. 2019).
73 352 Ga. App. 675, 835 S.E.2d 651 (2019).
74 See id.
75 303 Ga. 211, 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018).
76 Ga. App. Case #A17A2025 (February 27, 2018).
77 Peterson III, 352 Ga. App. 675, 835 S.E.2d 651.
78 Id. at 676–77, 835 S.E.2d at 653.
79 Id. at 677, 835 S.E.2d at 653.
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Trustees.” 80 Mary could not appoint property from the by-pass trust to
herself, but she could appoint the trust property to any descendant.
Notably, the by-pass trust contained a statement that Mr. Peterson’s
“primary desire is that my wife be supported in reasonable comfort
during her lifetime and that my children be supported in reasonable
comfort during their lives[,]” and his “secondary desire” was for the trust
principal to be “preserved as well as possible consonant with the
consummation of my primary objective.” 81
After the will was admitted to probate, the family began arguing about
how to administer the by-pass trust, with Mary and her son, Calhoun, on
one side of the dispute and sons David and Alex on the other. The latter
sued the former in separate petitions in separate courts for damages for
breach of fiduciary duty and sought to remove Mary and Calhoun as
trustees. The cases were consolidated by the superior court and that
court granted Mary and Calhoun’s motions for summary judgment. Alex
and David appealed. 82
The grants of summary judgment to Calhoun and Mary were both
reversed. 83 In Peterson II, the supreme court pointed out that, at the
point in time when the case was appealed, Mary had not exercised her
powers of appointment in both trusts in the manner required by the
terms of the trust (by a writing delivered to the trustees). 84 Consequently,
Mary retained a fiduciary duty over the trust assets as long as she was
serving as trustee. Specifically, the supreme court stated:
Mary’s mere right as a beneficiary to direct that property be turned
over to her or a descendant by a written instrument given to the
trustees does not diminish her duty as an executor and trustee not to
waste property of the estate or trusts while that property, as the record
currently shows, remains a part of the estate or trust. 85

While the appeals were being considered, Mary attempted to exercise
her powers of appointment under the marital and by-pass trusts to
transfer all the marital trust assets to herself and all the by-pass trust
assets to Calhoun. However, Alex and David refused to sign the
necessary documentation to complete the transfer. In response, Calhoun
filed a petition to remove Alex and David as trustees or alternatively to
Peterson II, 303 Ga. at 212, 811 S.E.2d at 311.
Peterson III, 352 Ga. App. at 677, 835 S.E.2d at 653.
82 Id. at 677, 835 S.E.2d at 653–54.
83 Id. at 678, 835 S.E.2d at 654. Calhoun’s case was appealed to the court of appeals and
the grant of summary judgment was reversed in Peterson I. Mary’s case was appealed to
the supreme court and the grant of summary judgment was reversed in Peterson II. Id.
84 Peterson II, 303 Ga. at 216, 811 S.E.2d 313.
85 Id. at 216, 811 S.E.2d at 313–14.
80
81
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compel them to execute the necessary documents for the transfer.
Calhoun and Mary also filed new motions for summary judgment with
the superior court as to nearly all the claims pending under Alex and
David’s lawsuit. 86
The superior court granted Calhoun’s petition as well as his and
Mary’s motions for summary judgment, ordering Alex and David to
execute the documents within fifteen days or be removed as trustees. 87
Citing a Connecticut case, Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyman, 88 the
superior court concluded that Mary, as a beneficiary who held powers of
appointment over the trust assets, did not owe Alex and David a fiduciary
duty as trustee while acting in her capacity as beneficiary and thus could
freely exercise her power of appointment to transfer the trusts’ assets to
herself and Calhoun “without regard to any fiduciary duty she may have
as a trustee.” 89
In Peterson III, the court of appeals found the superior court’s ruling
that Mary did not owe the beneficiaries a fiduciary duty when she
exercised her power of appointment under the marital and by-pass trusts
to be in error. 90 The court of appeals began its analysis by distinguishing
the Connecticut case relied upon by the superior court on the ground that
the wife in that case was the beneficiary of the trust but not a trustee, as
was Mary. 91 Moreover, even the Connecticut case stated that where the
beneficiary is also a trustee, the beneficiary has a quasi-fiduciary or
fiduciary relationship with co-beneficiaries. 92
The court of appeals noted that trustees are bound to administer trusts
impartially and “solely in the interests of the beneficiaries” according to
the provisions and purposes within the trust. 93 The court of appeals
stated that powers of appointment “are peculiarly subjects of equitable
supervision.” 94 The court of appeals quoted that following passage from
the 1977 supreme court case of Ringer v. Lockhart: 95

Peterson III, 352 Ga. App. at 678, 835 S.E.2d at 654.
Id.
88 170 A.2d 130 (Conn. 1961).
89 Peterson III, 352 Ga. App. at 678, 835 S.E.2d at 654.
90 Id. at 678–79, 835 S.E.2d at 654.
91 Id. at 679, 835 S.E.2d at 654.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 679, 835 S.E.2d at 655. See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-246(a) which provides: “A trustee
shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”
94 Id. at 679, 835 S.E.2d at 654. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-110 provides: “Powers, especially of
appointment, being always founded on trust or confidence, are peculiarly subjects of
equitable supervision.”
95 240 Ga. 82, 239 S.E.2d 349 (1977).
86
87
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It is generally, if not always, humanly impossible for the same person
to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same
transaction. Consciously or unconsciously he will favor one side as
against the other, where there is or may be a conflict of interest. If one
of the interests involved is that of the trustee personally, selfishness
is apt to lead him to give himself an advantage. If permitted to
represent antagonistic interests the trustee is placed under
temptation and is apt in many cases to yield to the natural prompting
to give himself the benefit of all doubts, or to make decisions which
favor the third person who is competing with the beneficiary. 96

The court of appeals also stated that “[i]t is not necessary to show that
the fiduciary succumbed to temptation, but rather, it is sufficient to show
that the fiduciary allowed herself to be placed in a position where her
personal interest might conflict with the interests of other
beneficiaries.” 97 Here, the “litany of litigation that has transcended
decades” 98 among the parties demonstrated to the court of appeals that
the potential for Mary’s exercise of her power of appointment to transfer
all assets in the by-pass trust to Calhoun was in conflict with the
interests of the other beneficiaries. 99 Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that Mary could not act exclusively as a beneficiary, nor could she
be excused from her fiduciary duties while acting as a beneficiary in
exercising her powers of appointment. 100
The court of appeals also held the superior court’s order to be
incongruent with the prior decisions of the supreme court and court of
appeals, both of which had found that the primary purpose of the by-pass
trust was to support Mr. Peterson’s three sons as well as Mary. 101 The
court of appeals pointed out that the “cardinal rule in construing a trust
instrument” is to determine and effectuate the settlor’s intent. 102 Quoting
language from the supreme court’s opinion in Peterson II, the court of
appeals reiterated that Mary was not permitted to disregard the primary
purpose of the by-pass trust to support the sons just because the other
primary purpose of the trust was to support her. 103 As concluded by the
supreme court, Mary’s power of appointment as beneficiary did not
“diminish her duty as an executor and trustee not to waste property of

96 Peterson III, 352 Ga. App. at 679, 835 S.E.2d at 655 (quoting Ringer v. Lockhart, 240
Ga. 82, 84, 239 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1977)).
97 Peterson III, 352 Ga. App at 680, 835 S.E.2d at 655.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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the estate or trusts.” 104 Therefore, Mary’s fiduciary duties to other
beneficiaries of the trust remained in effect despite her right as a
beneficiary to exercise the power of appointment. 105
Moreover, because the court of appeals found the superior court had
erred as to the first issue, the by-pass and marital trusts were still intact
and thus summary judgment as to Alex and David’s claims for breach of
fiduciary duty was improper. 106 Both the court of appeals and the
supreme court had previously ruled that issues of material fact existed
as to waste of trust assets and failure to fund the trusts properly. 107
Because those issues had not yet been determined in superior court on
remand, the granting of Mary and Calhoun’s second motions for
summary judgment violated the law of the case rule. 108
E. Proposed Ward Who Has Contacts with More Than One State
In 2016, Georgia enacted the “Uniform Adult Guardianship and
Conservatorship
Proceedings
Jurisdiction
Act”
(Guardianship
Jurisdiction Act). 109 Article 2 of the Guardianship Jurisdiction Act
addresses the problems that may arise when it is unclear which of two or
more states has jurisdiction over the imposition of a guardianship or
conservatorship. The Guardianship Jurisdiction Act creates a threetiered approach to jurisdictional issues. Under this approach, the state
court that may have jurisdiction would be in order of priority: (1) the
court in the “respondent’s” 110 home state; (2) the court of a state with
which the respondent has a significant connection; or (3) a third state
that is neither the home state nor a significant-connection state. 111 In
2019, the court of appeals handed down two decisions, In re Estate of
Hanson 112 and Steen-Jorgensen v. Huff, 113 that discussed whether the
courts below had properly applied the factors listed in the Guardianship
Id. (quoting Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. at 215–16, 811 S.E.2d 309, 314 (2018)).
Peterson II, 303 Ga. at 216, 811 S.E.2d at 314.
106 Peterson III, 352 Ga. App at 681, 835 S.E.2d at 656.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Ga. H.B. Bill 954, Reg. Sess., 2016 Ga. Laws 486. The Georgia act was modeled after
the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, copyright ©
2007, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The law is codified
as Chapter 11 of Title 29 of the Georgia Code.
110 The “respondent” is an adult over whom a guardianship or conservatorship is sought.
O.C.G.A. § 29-11-2(12) (2020). For a detailed discussion of the Georgia law pertaining to
the guardianship and conservatorship of adults see MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP Ch. 4 & 5 (Thomson-Reuters, 2019).
111 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-12 (2020).
112 353 Ga. App. 61, 834 S.E.2d 615 (2019).
113 352 Ga. App. 727, 835 S.E.2d 707 (2019).
104
105
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Jurisdiction Act when determining whether Georgia is a “significantconnection state” for purposes of exercising jurisdiction. 114
“Significant-connection state” is defined as one “with which [the]
respondent has a significant connection other than mere physical
presence and in which substantial evidence concerning the respondent is
available.” 115 Per O.C.G.A. § 29-11-10, 116 factors a court should consider
when determining whether a respondent has a significant connection to
a state are:
(1) The location of the respondent's family and other persons required
to be notified of the guardianship proceeding or conservatorship
proceeding; (2) The length of time the respondent at any time was
physically present in the state and the duration of any absence; (3) The
location of the respondent's property; (4) The extent to which the
respondent has ties to the state such as voting registration, state or
local tax return filing, vehicle registration, driver's license, social
relationship, and receipt of services; and (5) The extent to which the
respondent considers or, in the absence of an impairment of mental
faculties, would consider himself or herself to have a significant
connection with the state. 117

The significant-connection state “may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if it determines at any time that a court of another state is a
more appropriate forum.” 118 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-15(c) 119 lists the following
factors that a court must consider when determining whether a state is
an appropriate forum:
(1) Any expressed preference of the respondent; (2) Whether abuse,
neglect, or exploitation of the respondent has occurred or is likely to
occur and which state could best protect the respondent from the
abuse, neglect, or exploitation; (3) The length of time the respondent
was physically present in or was a legal resident of this or another
state; (4) The distance of the respondent from the court in each state;
(5) The financial circumstances of the respondent's estate; (6) The
nature and location of the evidence; (7) The ability of the court in each
state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to
present evidence; (8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the
facts and issues in the proceeding; and (9) If an appointment were

114 See In re Estate of Hanson, 353 Ga. App. at 64, 834 S.E.2d at 617; Steen-Jorgensen,
352 Ga. App. at 731–32, 835 S.E.2d at 710–11.
115 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-2(13) (2020).
116 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-10 (2019).
117 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-10 (2020).
118 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-15(a) (2020).
119 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-15(c) (2020).
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made, the court's ability to monitor the conduct of the guardian or
conservator. 120

In In Re Estate of Hanson, the adult over whom the guardianship was
sought, Kevin Hanson, was badly injured in an accident in Florida, where
he lived with his girlfriend. After receiving treatment in Florida, Kevin
was taken to the Shepherd Center in Atlanta for treatment. While he was
still in Atlanta, Kevin’s parents petitioned a Georgia probate court for
emergency guardianship and conservatorship, which the probate court
granted. Kevin’s parents then filed a petition for permanent
guardianship and conservatorship and an additional emergency petition.
The probate court granted both of these petitions. 121 The court found,
among other things, that Georgia had jurisdiction to hear the case
because Kevin had a significant connection to Georgia due to his
treatment at the Shepherd Center, despite the undisputed fact that
Georgia was not Kevin’s home state. 122
Even though the probate court did not state expressly which section of
the Guardianship Jurisdiction Act it was applying, the court of appeals
concluded that the court had found jurisdiction under O.C.G.A.
§ 29-11-12 123 because it was a significant connection state. 124 The court
of appeals pointed out that, under O.C.G.A. § 29-11-12(2)(B), 125 the
probate court could have jurisdiction despite the fact that Georgia was
not Kevin’s home state if several conditions were met. 126 Per O.C.G.A.
§ 29-11-12(2)(B)(i)–(iii), 127 the probate court would have to have
considered whether “(1) a petition for appointment or order was filed in
Florida, (2) an objection to Georgia’s jurisdiction had been filed by a
person required to be notified of the proceeding, or (3) whether Georgia
was an appropriate forum under the factors set forth in O.C.G.A.
§ 29-11-15.” 128
The court of appeals also stated that, to determine whether Georgia is
a significant-connection state to Kevin, the court was required to have
considered the five factors listed in O.C.G.A. § 29-11-10. 129 Specifically,
according to the court of appeals, although courts are not required to
make specific findings of fact as to each of the factors, the “trial court
Id.
In re Estate of Hanson, 353 Ga. App. at 61–62, 834 S.E.2d at 616.
122 353 Ga. App. at 62, 834 S.E.2d at 616.
123 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-12 (2019).
124 In re Estate of Hanson, 353 Ga. App. at 62, 834 S.E.2d at 616.
125 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-12(2)(B) (2019).
126 In re Estate of Hanson, 353 Ga. App. at 62, 834 S.E.2d at 616.
127 O.C.G.A. § 29-11-12(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (2019).
128 In re Estate of Hanson, 353 Ga. App. at 64, 834 S.E.2d at 617.
129 Id. at 63, 834 S.E.2d at 617.
120
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must set out upon the record the essential reasoning that forms the basis
for its exercise of discretion” so that an appellate court can determine
whether its exercise of discretion was proper. 130 The level of detail
necessary to satisfy this requirement depends upon “the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the closeness of the questions involved, and
the ground upon which the court decides the motion.” 131 Because the
probate court’s order did not show that the probate court had considered
the required factors set out in O.C.G.A. § 29-11-10, nor did it show that
the probate court had considered the factors in O.C.G.A.
§ 29-11-12(2)(B)(i)–(iii), the court of appeals vacated the appointment of
the parents as Kevin’s guardians and remanded the case for the probate
court to consider the factors it was required to consider before
establishing jurisdiction. 132
The individual on whom a guardianship was sought to be imposed in
Steen-Jorgensen v. Huff was Robert Sydney Brown, Jr., who had lived in
Georgia for nearly fifty years. He and his first wife, who had divorced in
the 1990s, had one daughter, Rebecca Steen-Jorgensen. In 2001, Mr.
Brown married Deborah, who also had a daughter from a previous
marriage, Toni Kay Huff. 133 When Deborah’s health declined in 2017, the
Browns left Georgia and moved to an assisted living facility selected by
Huff that was located in North Carolina, where Huff lived. When Mr.
Brown was later diagnosed with dementia, he and his wife were moved
into the facility’s memory care unit in different rooms. 134 SteenJorgensen, who lived in Florida, visited her father in North Carolina.
While there and after having interactions with Huff over the care of her
father, Steen-Jorgensen concluded that Huff was acting in the best
interests of herself and her mother but not of Mr. Brown. 135 She and her
husband filed a petition for guardianship and conservatorship over her
father in Georgia. 136 The trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction and
dismissed the case, finding that Georgia was Mr. Brown’s home state but
that North Carolina, where Mr. Brown lived, was a more appropriate
forum. 137
The court of appeals vacated the order of the trial court. 138 As noted
above, O.C.G.A. § 29-11-15(c) sets forth the factors courts should consider

Id.
Id. at 63–64, 834 S.E.2d at 617.
132 Id. at 64, 834 S.E.2d at 617.
133 Steen-Jorgensen, 352 Ga. App. at 727, 835 S.E.2d 708.
134 Id. at 727–28, 835 S.E.2d at 708.
135 Id. at 728, 835 S.E.2d at 708–09.
136 Id. at 728, 835 S.E.2d at 709.
137 Id. at 729, 835 S.E.2d at 709.
138 Id. at 732, 835 S.E.2d at 711.
130
131
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when determining whether another state is a more appropriate forum.
The trial court stated that it had considered each of the nine factors in
O.C.G.A. § 29-11-15(c). 139 However, according to the court of appeals, the
trial court failed to “apply the enumerated factors to the facts” 140 and
state which factors supported its decision. 141 The court of appeals found
that, although the statute does not “expressly require” courts to make
“specific findings on each factor, . . . the trial court must at a minimum
set out the essential reasoning that forms the basis for its exercise of
discretion[,]” 142 so that the appellate court can have a basis for
determining whether the trial court’s exercise of discretion was “reasoned
and reasonable.” 143
II. LEGISLATION AND GOVERNOR’S ORDER DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Georgia General Assembly
suspended its 2020 session in March 2020, and thus no significant
legislation was enacted during the reporting period. It should be noted,
however, that the General Assembly did enact extensive revisions to the
Georgia statutes pertaining to wills, trusts, and estate administration
when it reconvened in June 2020. These revisions had been prepared by
the Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia and passed by the
Georgia House of Representatives prior to the suspension of the
legislative session. 144 The Georgia State Senate approved this bill on
June 25, 2020. These revised statutes will be discussed in next year’s
report, which will cover the period from June 1, 2020 through May 31,
2021. The revisions are effective January 1, 2021.
In addition to the delay of expected legislation, another challenge faced
estate planning attorneys during the COVID-19 crisis. Many of the basic
estate planning documents including wills, financial powers of attorney,
advance directives for health care, and deeds require that the maker sign
the document in the “presence” of witnesses and a notary public. 145
During the pandemic, the gathering together of people for a signing
ceremony became problematic. Shelter-in-place orders and general fear
of infection caused lawyers, their staff personnel, and clients to be
reluctant to risk the type of person-to-person contact that caused the
Id. at 731, 835 S.E.2d at 710–11.
Id. at 731, 835 S.E.2d at 710.
141 Id. at 731–32, 835 S.E.2d at 710–11.
142 Id. at 731, 835 S.E.2d at 710.
143 Id.
144 Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess. (2020).
145 For a discussion of the “presence” requirement, see MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN:
WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 5.4 (2019–2020 ed. 2019).
139
140
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virus to be spread. In addition, nursing homes and other senior living
facilities imposed strict restrictions on visits by outsiders, making it
difficult for lawyers to have access to their clients.
On April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Exec. Order No. 04.09.20.01, 146
effective immediately and through the end of the day on the date the
Public Health State of Emergency Order 147 terminated or ceased to be
renewed. Exec. Order No. 04.09.20.01 allows for the remote witnessing
and notarization of a variety of documents. 148 The section of the Order
that deals with remote notarizations includes these requirements: (1)
“[t]he notary public [must] use[] real-time [video] . . . technology . . . that
allows the parties to communicate with each other simultaneously by
sight and sound . . . .;” (2) the notary public must be a Georgia attorney
or be operating under the supervision of a Georgia attorney; (3) the
individual whose signature is to be notarized must provide appropriate
proof of identity; (4) the notary public must be “physically located in . . .
Georgia;” and (5) the individual whose signature is to be notarized must
send the document to the notary public on the same day that it is
signed. 149 The Order lists certain documents that may require the
physical presence of witnesses under Georgia law 150 and states that the
witnessing requirement “may be satisfied by the use of audio-video
communication technology or any similar real-time means of electronic
video conferencing that allows all of the parties to communicate with
each other simultaneously by sight and sound.” 151 The final sections state
that the official date and time of the notarization or witnessing shall be
the date and time of execution by the notary or witnesses and also require

146 Exec. Order No. 04.09.20.01 (April 9, 2020). Executive Order 04.09.20.01 is available
on the 2020 Georgia Executive Orders website, https://gov.georgia.gov/executiveaction/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders.
147 Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (March 14, 2020). Governor Brian Kemp declared a
statewide Public Health State of Emergency on March 14, 2020, with Executive Order
03.14.20.01. The Order was extended several times and continued in place through the
summer of 2020.
148 Exec. Order No. 03.31.20.01 (March 31, 2020). Earlier, on March 31, 2020, the
Governor had issued Executive Order 03.31.20.01 that authorizes remote notarization of
real estate documents.
149 Exec. Order No. 04.09.20.01 (April 9, 2020).
150 Id. The Order listed the following Georgia Code sections and documents: “Code
Sections 10-6B-5, 15-9-86, 19-3-62, 19-8-4, 19-8-5, 19-8-6,19-8-7, 29-2-11, 29-4-3, 29-5-3,
31-32-5, 44-5-128, 44-5-143, 44-5-144, 44-5-145, or 53-4-20, including a power of attorney,
verified petition filed in probate court, antenuptial agreement, surrender of rights for
adoption, return filed in probate court, standby guardian designation, nomination of
guardian, nomination of conservator, advance directive for health care, designation of
successor custodian, will, codicil, or other document . . . .”
151 Id.
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that the notary and witnesses must sign on the same date as the signer
signed the document. 152
At the request of the State Bar of Georgia, the Fiduciary Law Section
of the State Bar of Georgia produced a set of “Suggested Procedures for
Remote Notarization and Attestation of Estate Planning Documents in
Georgia.” 153 These were released on April 13, 2020. The State Bar of
Georgia also issued its own “General Best Practices under Executive
Order 04.09.20.01 and FAQs” for complying with Executive Order
04.09.20.01. 154 The Fiduciary Law Section “Suggested Procedures”
contain procedures that “must” be followed (pursuant to the EO) and
procedures that “should” be followed. The Fiduciary Law Section
“Suggested Procedures” are as follows:
1. The audio-video communication technology (“AVCT”) must allow for
simultaneous (real-time) communication among the individual signing
the document (“the signer”) and the witness(es) and/or notary public
(“the witness(es)”) by sight and sound.
2. For notarization, the notary public must be an attorney licensed to
practice law in Georgia or be operating under the supervision of an
attorney licensed to practice law in Georgia. (“Supervision” means that
the notary public “is an employee, independent contractor, agent, or
other representative of an attorney or an attorney observes the
execution of documents either in person or via the real-time audiovideo communication technology.”)
3. The signer should be physically located in Georgia during the AVCT
session.
4. The witness(es) should be physically located in Georgia during the
AVCT session. (For notarization, the notary public must be physically
located in Georgia.)
5. If the signer is not personally known to the witness(es), the signer
should present valid photo identification during the AVCT session.
(For notarization, the signer must present “satisfactory evidence of
identity as required in Code Section 45-17-8, while connected to the
real-time audio-video communication technology.”)

Id.
THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FIDUCIARY LAW SECTION, SUGGESTED PROCEDURES FOR
REMOTE NOTARIZATION AND ATTESTATION OF ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS IN GEORGIA
(2020).
154 Id.
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153
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6. The signer should affirmatively state during the AVCT session the
nature of the document the signer is signing.
7. Each page of the document being witnessed should be shown to the
witness(es) and initialed by the signer. The signer’s act of initialing
should be sufficiently visible during the AVCT session for the
witness(es) to observe.
8. The document should be signed and dated (with time of signature)
by the signer. The signer’s act of signing the document should be
sufficiently visible during the AVCT session for the witness(es) to
observe.
9. After signing, the signer should transmit (by electronic
communication, fax, or courier) a legible copy of the entire signed
document directly to the witness(es) on the same calendar day that the
signer signs.
10. The witness(es) should sign and date the transmitted copy of the
document as witness(es) on the same calendar day that the signer
signs. If there is a requirement that the document be attested in the
presence of the signer, the witness’s act of signing the document should
be sufficiently visible during the AVCT session for the signer to
observe.
11. For a document requiring more than one witness, each witness may
participate in the AVCT session(s) with the signer and other
witness(es) from different locations, and the signed document may be
transmitted from the signer to a witness and then to subsequent
witness(es) so that each party will have signed on the same copy of the
document.
12. The document, including any attestation, jurat, acknowledgment,
or certificate signed by the witness(es), should state that the applicable
requirement under Georgia law was satisfied under the authority of
Executive Order 04.09.20.01.
13. After signing, the witness(es) should deliver (by courier, U.S. Mail,
or express delivery) the entire document signed by the witness(es) to
the signer (or the signer’s attorney) within a reasonable period of time.
14. The Executive Order provides: “[T]he official date and time of the
notarization or witnessing . . . shall be the date and time when the
notary and/or witness(es) witness the signature via the video
conference technology.”
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15. When feasible, a document signed pursuant to these procedures
should be re-executed under ordinary procedures at a later time. 155

155

Id. (alterations in original).
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